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THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT: 
A SEVERE IMPLICATION WITHOUT EXPLANATION 
The terms of the act do not authorize the infliction of a penalty greater . . . . Is 
there a safe implication that authority to inflict a greater penalty was intended 
to be conferred? The objections to this seem to me too strong to be overcome. 
In the first place, mere implication can hardly ever be safe ground on which to 
rest a penalty, and when penalties of unlimited magnitude are the subjects of 
the implication, the danger of making it, and the improbability of its 
correctness, are proportionably increased. 
—Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) mandates imprisonment for 
“not less than fifteen years” for a felon in possession of a firearm with three or 
more prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.2 However, 
the ACCA is silent as to a maximum sentence.3 Although Congress has 
amended the ACCA several times, its plain language has clearly prescribed a 
penalty of “not less than fifteen years” since it was enacted in 1984.4 
Many people believe the phrase “not less than fifteen years” implies that a 
judge may sentence any amount of years above fifteen, including life. 
However, that interpretation is oversimplified and wrong in a statutory and 
sentencing context. Rather than a range from fifteen years to life, the “not less 
than fifteen years” phrase should be read to authorize a fixed term of fifteen 
years imprisonment. 
The difference is both obvious and significant. Under the ACCA, either 
every sentence must be fifteen years or judges have discretion to sentence in a 
range from fifteen years to life. As of now, the U.S. Supreme Court has held 
that appellate courts should review district court sentences under an abuse of 
discretion standard, which is highly deferential.5 Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas believe that the Sixth Amendment prohibits appellate review of the 
substance of trial judges’ discretionary sentencing choices imposed within the 
 
 1. Stimpson v. Pond, 23 F. Cas. 101, 102 (D. Mass. 1855). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59–60 (2007). 
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statutory minimum and maximum.6 They reason that district courts must be 
able to sentence to the maximum of the statutory range granted by Congress 
and that the sentencing judge’s discretionary power must be absolute and 
unreviewable.7 To that end, if the ACCA contains a range of fifteen years to 
life, then it will be very difficult, and nearly impossible in Scalia’s and 
Thomas’s view, for a defendant to successfully appeal any sentence within that 
range. 
This Comment will argue that the “shall be . . . imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years” language in the ACCA does not contain an implied maximum of 
life imprisonment; rather the statute’s text, structure, legislative history, and 
current adjudicative mechanism, along with Supreme Court Justices’ 
viewpoints, support the translation of the imprisonment language to constitute 
a fixed term of fifteen years. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF THE ACCA 
A. General Background 
The ACCA in its current form states: 
 [A] person who violates . . . 922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions 
by any court referred to in . . . 922(g)(1) . . . for a violent felony or a serious 
drug offense, or both . . . shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years, 
and . . . the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary 
sentence to, such person.8 
The felon in possession statute, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which is the underlying 
crime of the ACCA, carries an expressed maximum term of ten years 
imprisonment.9 The enhanced ACCA sentence becomes available to the 
sentencing court when the individual convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not 
just a one-time felon, but has three or more prior violent felonies10 or serious 
 
 6. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 370 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 7. Id. 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Section 922(g) outlaws a list of certain individuals, one of which 
is a prior felon, from shipping or transporting in interstate or foreign commerce, or possessing in 
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. See id. § 922(g). It is 
widely known as the federal felon in possession of a firearm statute. Section 922(g)(1) states, 
“[W]ho has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year.” Id. § 922(g)(1). 
 9. Id. § 924(a)(2). 
 10. The term “violent felony” under the ACCA refers to any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use 
or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment 
for such term if committed by an adult, that either has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another or is burglary, arson, or extortion, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 593 
drug offenses.11 In 2012, the average sentence length for offenders with only 
one or two prior felonies under § 922(g) was forty-six months, whereas the 
average sentence length for offenders with three or more prior felonies 
sentenced under the ACCA was 180 months.12 
The ACCA’s enhanced sentence applies in cases of mere possession, 
regardless of whether the defendant used the firearm or was engaged in any 
other criminal conduct at the time.13 Further, the ACCA also criminalizes a 
defendant in possession of ammunition, even without a firearm.14 In United 
States v. Cardoza, the First Circuit upheld the district court’s imposition of a 
nineteen-year imprisonment sentence to a defendant who was only in 
possession of one bullet.15 As long as the defendant has the requisite prior 
convictions, regardless of the age that they occurred, simply possessing a 
firearm or ammunition qualifies for the underlying offense of the ACCA.16 
Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984 to invoke federal jurisdiction to 
incapacitate individuals committing a large portion of crimes, because state 
prosecutorial resources were inadequate and failed to address this problem.17 
State law enforcement traditionally dealt with violent felonies.18 However, 
many states lacked sufficient resources to confront increasing problems of 
court congestion and prison overcrowding in their localities.19 Consequently, 
state legislators proved reluctant to strengthen their “revolving door” 
sentencing statutes to allow for longer confinement in their already 
overpopulated prisons.20 As a result, judges regularly sentenced repeat felons 
to brief lengths of imprisonment, and frequently even probation.21 Congress 
 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 11. The term “serious drug offense” refers to almost all drug offenses under either state or 
federal laws that carry a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more prescribed by law. 
Id. § 924(e)(2)(A). 
 12. Quick Facts, USSC.GOV, http://www.ussc.gov/Quick_Facts/Quick_Facts_Felon_in_Pos 
session_of_a_Firearm.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
 13. David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons from 
Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 52 (2008). 
 14. United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 15. Id. (emphasis added). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A). 
 17. Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug 
Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1177 (2010). 
 18. See id. (discussing the legislative history of the Armed Career Criminal Act). 
 19. Id. at 1178 n.220. 
 20. 98 CONG. REC. 19,855–56 (1983) (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
 21. On page 29 in the Armed Career Criminal Act 1983 Senate Hearing, William Cahalan 
testified that in Wisconsin that year, 63% of the adult males convicted of a felony—who had 
previously been convicted of another felony—were placed on probation. In Florida that same 
year, 80% of those convicted of a felony were placed on probation. Armed Career Criminal Act 
of 1983: Hearing on S. 52 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 29 (1983) 
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recognized that many repeat felons did not lose one day of freedom as a result 
of many states’ inability to incarcerate them.22 Accordingly, Congress passed 
the ACCA to increase the participation of the federal law enforcement system 
by creating a consistent federal penalty to reduce crimes committed by armed, 
habitual criminals.23 
All of the courts of appeals that have interpreted the ACCA read it to 
contain an implied maximum sentence of life imprisonment.24 The Supreme 
Court has said in mere dicta that the ACCA contains a maximum of life, but 
the Court has never ruled on this issue.25 Statements in a Supreme Court 
opinion, which are not necessary to the decision, are not binding authority.26 
Although no court has endorsed such a reading, it bears to mention that the 
ACCA certainly precludes implication of a greater maximum penalty than life 
imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court has noted that a “life 
sentence without parole is the second most severe penalty permitted by law.”27 
Since its enactment, the ACCA has always prohibited parole.28 Accordingly, 
when courts imply life imprisonment as the maximum sentence permitted by 
the ACCA, it is necessarily without the possibility of parole. If a court 
sentences an offender to life plus any number of years, it also is equivalent to 
life without parole.29 Because the imposition of the death penalty requires 
 
[hereinafter Hearings on S. 52] (statement of William Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney of Wayne 
Cnty., Va.). The record from the Senate hearing on the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1982 
indicates that in Pennsylvania, for those offenders who committed robbery with a firearm and had 
two prior robbery or burglary convictions, the average time of incarceration was less than four 
years; for those convicted and sentenced for burglary who had two or more prior burglary or 
robbery convictions, the average sentence was less than ten months. S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 35–36 
(1982). 
 22. Hearing on S. 52, supra note 21. 
 23. 98 CONG. REC. 26,901 (1984). 
 24. United States v. Walker, 720 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Weems, 322 
F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 
(6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1100 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1987); Walberg v. United States, 763 F.2d 143, 148–49 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
 25. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). 
 26. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 737 (2007); 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399–400 (1821). 
 27. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50 (2010) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 1001 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 7–8 (1984) (The Resolution states that such person “shall 
not be eligible for parole”). 
 29. See Vance v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 4:08-CV-1185, 2009 WL 302054, 
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2009). 
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constitutional protections clearly absent from the ACCA, there is no existing 
higher maximum penalty to imply than the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law: life without parole. 
B. The Three Previous Convictions Requirement 
Unlike the ACCA’s sentencing phrase, the predicate offenses provision has 
been the subject of frequent Supreme Court litigation. There have been thirteen 
Supreme Court cases that have attempted to clarify the statute’s language with 
regard to its three previous convictions requirement.30 The requirement 
encompasses a defendant’s past convictions under both state and federal 
criminal statutes.31 But, given the various definitions of different states’ 
crimes, past convictions may or may not qualify under the definitions the 
ACCA prescribes for violent felonies and serious drug offenses. 
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court established a rule to 
determine when a defendant’s prior conviction counts as one of the ACCA’s 
enumerated predicate offenses.32 One of the enumerated predicate offenses in 
the ACCA is burglary.33 The Court noted that the ACCA fails to define 
specific elements of burglary, and therefore interpreted it to require the 
elements of a generic burglary offense.34 In assessing whether the defendant’s 
prior burglary conviction under California law sufficed for generic burglary 
under the ACCA, the Court adopted a “formal categorical approach.”35 Under 
this approach, the sentencing court may look only to the statutory definitions 
(i.e. the elements) of a defendant’s prior convictions and not to the particular 
facts underlying those particular convictions.36 
If the relevant statute (in Taylor, the California burglary statute) has the 
same elements as the “generic” ACCA crime (burglary), then the prior 
conviction can serve as one of the three predicate offenses.37 Similarly, if the 
 
 30. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2279 (2013); Sykes v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2267, 2272–73 (2011); McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (2011); Johnson v. 
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 134 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 124 (2009); 
United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 380–81 (2008); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 
139 (2008); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 26 (2007); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 
192, 195 (2007); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); Daniels v. United States, 532 
U.S. 374, 376 (2001); Custis, 511 U.S. at 487; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577–78 
(1990). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 32. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 607). 
 33. The ACCA says “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . that . . . is burglary . . . ” qualifies for a violent felony for purposes of a predicate 
conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
 34. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 607). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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relevant statute defines the crime more narrowly, then the prior conviction can 
serve as an ACCA predicate because one guilty of the narrower crime’s 
elements is necessarily guilty of the broader generic crime’s elements.38 
However, if the statute is broader than the generic crime, then a conviction 
under that statute cannot count as an ACCA predicate, even if the defendant’s 
acts would satisfy all of the generic crime’s elements.39 The key is the 
elements of the crime, not the facts.40 
To illustrate this concept, let us look closer at the situation in Taylor. The 
predicate offense at issue was a conviction under a California burglary 
statute.41 It provides that a person who enters certain locations, lawfully or 
unlawfully, with intent to commit larceny or any other felony, is guilty of 
burglary.42 This statute is broader than generic burglary because most burglary 
statutes require the entry into the location to be unlawful.43 Under the 
California statute, one who enters a grocery store and shoplifts could be 
convicted.44 But, that same defendant could not be convicted under a generic 
burglary statute because it requires unlawful entry.45 As a result, the California 
statute was overbroad and the defendant’s prior conviction did not qualify as 
one of the three required predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA, even 
though his actual conduct may have fit under a generic burglary statute.46 
In Shepard v. United States, the Supreme Court applied a “modified 
categorical approach,” which allows the sentencing court to look beyond the 
statutory elements to the charging paper and jury instructions used in a case.47 
The defendant had a prior conviction under a Massachusetts burglary statute 
with alternative elements—the statute prohibited entry into a building and, 
additionally, prohibited entry into boats and cars.48 This is an example of a 
divisible statute, meaning it contains multiple alternative versions of the 
crime.49 One of the three alternatives (entry into a building) corresponds to an 
element in generic burglary, whereas the latter two alternatives (entry into a 
boat or car) do not.50 Therefore, no one could know, merely looking at the 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2282. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282. 
 45. Id. at 2283. 
 46. Id. at 2286. 
 47. Id. at 2283–84. 
 48. Id. at 2284. 
 49. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. 
 50. Id. 
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Massachusetts statute, which alternative the defendant was convicted of.51 
However, since the statute was divisible, the Supreme Court authorized the 
sentencing court to examine a limited set of materials, namely the terms of the 
plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between the judge and defendant, to 
determine if the defendant had pled guilty to entering a building, car, or boat.52 
The Court emphasized the narrow scope of the modified categorical approach: 
it was not to determine the facts of the defendant’s underlying conduct in his 
prior conviction, but only to determine whether he pled to the version of the 
crime in the Massachusetts statute that corresponded to the generic offense 
(burglary of a building).53 
The Court reasoned that the modified categorical approach would be 
applicable in a typical case brought under a divisible statute because the 
prosecutor charges one of the alternatives.54 So when the defendant pled guilty 
in a prior conviction, the sentencing court could scrutinize the terms of the plea 
agreement and transcript of colloquy between the judge and defendant to 
determine which alternative version he pled to.55 However, the modified 
categorical approach also applies when a jury finds a defendant guilty of a 
crime under a divisible statute.56 Since the judge instructs the jury which 
alternative element of the offense is charged, if the alternative comports with 
the generic crime, then the jury must necessarily find all of the elements of the 
generic crime.57 In order to determine if the jury found the defendant guilty of 
the generic offense, the sentencing court may scrutinize a limited set of 
documents (i.e. the indictment and jury instruction).58 
C. How the Enhancement Works 
Under the ACCA, the instant offense tried before a jury is the possession 
of a firearm prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Supreme Court has held 
in a broad sense that a defendant’s prior convictions do not need to be set forth 
in the indictment or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.59 Rather, once 
the jury renders a guilty verdict for a felon in possession, then the sentencing 
court judge considers the defendant’s prior record for the requisite three prior 
convictions.60 Using the categorical approach or the modified categorical 
approach, if the sentencing judge finds three predicate convictions by a 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005)). 
 53. Id. at 2285. 
 54. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2281. 
 59. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998). 
 60. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. 
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preponderance of the evidence, then the sentencing range increases from a 
maximum of ten years to not less than fifteen years.61 The judge uses the 
existence of the prior convictions along with the instant offense to sentence the 
defendant within the range provided by the ACCA. 
Courts base their adjudicative procedures for the ACCA on two cases: 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States62 and Apprendi v. New Jersey.63 Courts 
rely on Almendarez-Torres to categorize the ACCA as a sentencing-
enhancement penalty provision, rather than a new, separate offense.64 
Consequently, the ACCA’s predicate convictions are not required to be 
charged in the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.65 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi authorizes a judge to look only at 
the fact of the prior convictions, rather than the defendant’s conduct in those 
convictions, when imposing a sentence under the ACCA.66 
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held in a 5–4 decision that a 
sentencing judge (rather than a jury) may determine a fact of a defendant’s 
prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence (rather than beyond a 
reasonable doubt) to sentence a defendant in excess of a statutory maximum.67 
The statute at issue in Almendarez-Torres, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), raises the 
penalty from a maximum of two years to twenty years for a deported alien who 
returns to the United States if the alien has a prior conviction for an aggravated 
felony.68 The issue before the Court was whether this statute manifests a 
penalty provision or a new substantive crime.69 If the statute is merely a 
penalty provision that authorizes an enhanced sentence, then the Government 
is not required to charge the fact of the earlier felony conviction in the 
indictment because the earlier conviction is relevant only to the sentencing of a 
defendant found guilty of the charged crime.70 However, if the statute sets 
forth a new crime, the prior felony conviction must be charged in the 
indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.71 The Court 
 
 61. See id. at 2294 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 62. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 224. 
 63. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487–90 (2000). 
 64. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2295 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 65. Id. at 2288. 
 66. Id. at 2294 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226–27. 
 68. Id. at 226. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. The charged crime in this case was 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which prohibits a deported 
alien from returning to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2012). 
 71. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204 (1977) (noting that the Due Process 
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements included in the 
definition of the offense of which a defendant is charged); see also In re Matter of Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except 
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indicated that statutes authorizing higher sentences for recidivists do not create 
a separate offense with new elements.72 Rather, the Court identified the fact of 
a prior conviction as a mere sentencing factor that the sentencing judge 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence.73 
The Court grounded its decision on Congressional intent.74 The definition 
of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature.75 As such, Congress 
decides whether a prior conviction in a statute helps to define a separate crime 
or operates as a sentencing factor.76 The Court noted that the legislative history 
of § 1326(b)(2) contained no language to suggest Congress intended to create a 
new substantive crime.77 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a jury.78 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee a 
jury, standing between a defendant and the power of the State, to find any 
disputed fact essential to increase the ceiling of a potential sentence.79 
Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment guarantees fair notice of every element of 
a crime that the law makes essential to the punishment to be inflicted.80 
II.  ARGUMENT 
A. Expressions by Supreme Court Justices 
The ACCA is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). One of the ACCA’s 
neighboring provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), also uses the “not less than” 
language without any expressed maximum sentence. In United States v. 
O’Brien, the defendant was prosecuted under § 924(c) for brandishing a 
firearm in relation to a crime of violence.81 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) prescribes 
a sentence of “not less than 30 years” if the firearm was a machine gun.82 The 
 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 
he is charged.”). 
 72. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226. 
 73. Id. at 235. 
 74. Id. at 228. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 233–34. 
 78. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 79. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005). 
 80. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 507. 
 81. United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 222 (2010) (the actual issue in the case was 
whether the fact that a firearm was a machine gun should be an element or a sentencing factor). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
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Court ultimately never resolved whether the statute contained a fixed sentence 
of 30 years or an implied life maximum. 
However, three Supreme Court Justices expressed serious doubts during 
the oral argument, without disagreement from anyone else on the bench, when 
the Government suggested the “not less than” language implied a life 
maximum.83 
Justice Scalia voiced skepticism: “Where – where is the life sentence 
maximum, by the way? . . . Where is that specified?”84 When the Government 
responded that lower courts have understood the statute to imply a maximum 
of life, Justice Scalia turned to the text of the statute: “Where—where do you 
get the life maximum? I—I’m reading through, and there’s – it mentions 
nothing about life. . . . And if it mentions nothing about life, then these are not 
mandatory minimums. To the contrary, they are—they are new maximums.”85 
The Government asserted that the “not less than” language can only mean 
that a higher sentence would be appropriate, which prompted Justice Ginsburg 
to express puzzlement: “Where do you get the maximum? You say oh, these 
are just minimums. . . . But where is—where is the maximum?”86 
Justice Sotomayor raised a constitutional concern with the Government’s 
position, “Is there a Sixth Amendment problem with reading a statute this way, 
with—with reading a statute to provide for an unlimited maximum when 
Congress hasn’t specified it, and now you’re going to have the judge find the 
minimum and the maximum?”87 
The Government reiterated its belief that the “not less than” language 
implied a maximum term of life. This answer troubled Justice Scalia: “I don’t 
find that implied at all. I don’t see why it’s implied.”88 
Justice Sotomayor again admonished the Government about a 
constitutional problem with their position and then endorsed Justice Scalia’s 
earlier interpretation: “Isn’t there a Sixth Amendment problem with not 
knowing what you are exposed to? And then doesn’t the minimum in that case 
sort of become de facto the maximum?”89 
The Supreme Court in O’Brien never ruled whether the “not less than” 
language constitutes a fixed term or a thirty-to-life sentencing range because it 
was unnecessary to decide the central issue in the case.90 Nevertheless, the 
three Justices’ above-stated viewpoints attest to the “not less than” language 
 
 83. United States v. Walker, 720 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 84. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010) (No. 
08-1569). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Walker, 720 F.3d at 708; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 14. 
 87. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 15. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Walker, 720 F.3d at 710. 
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providing a fixed-term of years when an expressed statutory maximum is 
absent. 
B. Stimpson v. Pond and Lin v. United States 
These interpretations articulated by the three Justices reflect a court 
opinion written by one of their predecessors on the bench more than 150 years 
ago. While riding circuit in the mid-1800s, Justice Curtis held in Stimpson v. 
Pond that a federal statute prescribing “a penalty of not less than one hundred 
dollars . . . . d[id] not authorize the infliction of a greater penalty than one 
hundred dollars.”91 Rather, the “act authorize[d] the infliction of a penalty of 
just one hundred dollars for the offence described[.]”92 Justice Curtis reasoned 
that the “[p]ower to inflict a particular penalty must be conferred by Congress 
in such terms as will bear a strict construction[]” and the power was 
“exhausted by imposing a penalty of just one hundred dollars.”93 
Justice Curtis specifically rejected the notion of an implied maximum 
above the prescribed penalty: “mere implication can hardly ever be a safe 
ground on which to rest a penalty, and when penalties of unlimited magnitude 
are the subjects of the implication, the danger of making it, and the 
improbability of its correctness, are proportionately increased.”94 The phrase 
“not less than,” with no accompanied maximum, “requires stronger implication 
than is found in the language” to provide a penalty above the expressed term.95 
Later, in the early 1900s, in Lin v. United States, the Eighth Circuit 
confronted a similar statute in an imprisonment context and reached the same 
conclusion.96 The federal statute at issue prescribed a penalty of “not less than 
five years” without an expressed maximum sentence for a particular drug 
offense.97 The Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the availability of a life-
imprisonment sentence under the statute.98 Citing Stimpson, the Eighth Circuit 
held the “statute fixes a certain punishment of five years.”99 
Both Stimpson and Lin remain good law; neither has been overruled or 
modified. This foundation set by Justice Curtis, held by the Eighth Circuit, and 
echoed by Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Sotomayor should instruct the 
interpretation of “not less than” in the ACCA because they contemplated the 
language in a very similar context. 
 
 91. Stimpson v. Pond, 23 F. Cas. 101, 102 (D. Mass. 1855). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Lee Mow Lin v. United States, 250 F. 694, 695 (8th Cir. 1918). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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C. Legislative History and Intent 
If a statute is susceptible to more than one meaning, the legislative history 
should be reviewed to determine congressional intent.100 In order to inform the 
correct interpretation of the clause “not less than fifteen years,” it is helpful to 
examine the meaning of the phrase as indicated by the congressmen who 
authored and enacted the statute. 
Senator Arlen Specter originally proposed a career criminal bill in 1981.101 
This bill was rejected and modified several times before eventually being 
passed into law as the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984. In its first version 
of the bill, Congress made it a federal offense for a defendant to commit any 
robbery or burglary with a firearm if such defendant had two or more previous 
robbery or burglary convictions under either federal or state laws.102 Congress 
drafted an extremely harsh sentencing phrase mandating that a career criminal 
“upon conviction shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.”103 
After several hearings, however, Congress proposed a reduced sentence 
declaring that offenders “shall . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
not less than fifteen (15) years nor more than life . . . .”104 This amendment 
was significant, indicating that Congress did not want to require a life sentence 
in every case, but rather provide a range of penalties.105 Notably, Congress 
inserted the phrase “nor more than life” to define a sentencing range of fifteen 
years to life in this bill.106 Congress noted that a rapid decline in criminal 
propensities once career criminals reached the age of thirty convinced them to 
reduce the imprisonment term.107 
President Reagan vetoed the 1982 bill for federalism reasons; he was 
concerned that the law’s jurisdictional interplay between federal and local 
prosecutors would produce strained relationships because it federalized 
traditionally local crimes of armed robbery and armed burglary.108 In response, 
Congress redrafted the bill to proscribe felons with three prior robbery or 
 
 100. Jill C. Rafaloff, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statue or New 
Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091 (1988). 
 101. Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 1688 Before the Subcomm. on 
Juvenile Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 3 (1981). 
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id. 
 104. S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 3 (1982) (emphasis added). 
 105. See id. at 77. 
 106. Id. at 3. 
 107. Id. at 77. 
 108. See S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 3 (1983) (“President Reagan declined to sign the [larger crime 
package of which the bill was a part] . . . . He also expressed concern about the jurisdictional 
nature of the local prosecutor’s ‘veto’ power over Federal prosecutions contained in the career 
criminal portion of the bill.”). 
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burglary convictions from receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms.109 
This allowed for federal imprisonment of career criminals without radically 
expanding federal jurisdiction over common law crimes.110 It merely served as 
an enhanced penalty for a three-time felon convicted of the underlying federal 
offense—felon in receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms. 
Congress revised the bill’s sentencing provision to state that career 
criminals “shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years.”111 Congress 
completely eliminated the “nor more than life” wording from the bill.112 
Additionally, Congress replaced the phrase “be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of” with the term “imprisoned.”113 This specific language was 
duplicated in the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 and still functions as the 
imprisonment language in the ACCA today.114 
Several individual legislators provided commentary during hearings 
regarding the ACCA’s sentencing language. Even though a number of 
individual legislators proposed that the ACCA implied a sentencing range with 
a life maximum,115 there were also statements that suggested a fixed term of 
fifteen years.116 The Supreme Court has expressed misgivings about the 
credibility of remarks by individual legislators: “First, the views of a single 
legislator, even a bill’s sponsor, are not controlling[,]”117 rather, they express 
the views of only one member of a committee.118 Furthermore, none of these 
comments addressed the changes in imprisonment language that occurred from 
1982 to 1983. Therefore, these comments are unavailing to the correct 
interpretation of the ACCA’s penalty because they connote a variety of 
 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 5–6 (1984). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Hearings on S. 52, supra note 21, at 8. 
 112. Id. at 5. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 7–8. 
 115. Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 13 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 
1627 and S. 52] (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (“[A]nd minimum mandatory sentences of 
fifteen years to life.”); Hearing on S. 52, supra note 21, at 11 (statement of James Knapp, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division) (“If found guilty, a defendant so prosecuted would have 
to be sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years to life imprisonment.”). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 5 (1984) (“[T]he mandatory 15-year penalty is available.”); 
Hearing on S. 52, supra note 21 (statement of William Cahalan) (“[The ACCA] provides 
certain . . . punishment. . . . [C]ertainty of punishment is critical to the deterrence of criminal 
activity and protection of the community.”). Merriam-Webster defines ‘mandatory’ as “required 
by law or rule.” Mandatory Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mandatory (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). The 15-year 
penalty is required. Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52, supra note 115, at 37 (statement of Rep. Ron 
Wyden) (“[W]ould face a mandatory 15-year sentence in prison, with no eligibility for parole.”). 
 117. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 132 S. Ct. 740, 752 (2012). 
 118. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 92–93 (2001). 
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meanings and Congress’s actions speak louder than its individual members’ 
words. 
More important is what Congress wrote down and eventually passed as 
legislation.119 The following two modifications in the imprisonment language 
from 1982 to 1983 collectively reveal Congress’s intention to foreclose the 
availability of a life sentence:120 revoking the “nor more than life” upper 
boundary and inserting “imprisoned” in place of the phrase “sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment.” 
First, Congress deleted the words “nor more than life” prior to enacting the 
ACCA into law, which signifies that Congress did not intend to authorize a 
sentencing range up to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court has pointed out 
that “[f]ew principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the 
proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory 
language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”121 This casts 
serious doubt on the idea that Congress intended an implied maximum of life 
imprisonment after discarding the “nor more than life” language. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has reasoned that if Congress sought to grant something in 
a statute, it would not intentionally substitute a confusion-generating term for 
pre-existing language that unambiguously carried out that objective.122 In the 
ACCA, “not less than fifteen years” is a confusion-generating term substituted 
in place of the pre-existing language “not less than fifteen years nor more than 
life,” which unambiguously carried out the objective of imposing a fifteen 
years to life sentencing range. It follows that Congress would not remove the 
unambiguous provision in the 1982 bill if it intended to impose a life 
maximum in the ACCA. Deletion of a provision from a bill “strongly militates 
against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to 
enact.”123 Certainly, interpreting the substituted confusing language identical to 
the deleted unambiguous language is particularly dangerous when one’s liberty 
depends on the interpretation. Accordingly, Congress’s abandonment of the 
“nor more than life” provision suggests it did not intend the ACCA to contain 
life imprisonment as a maximum. 
Secondly, the “shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years” 
provision does not implicitly grant a life maximum sentence, but rather 
underscores Congress’s pressing desire that ACCA offenders actually serve an 
entire fifteen year prison sentence. In a Senate report on September 24, 1982, 
 
 119. See Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 752 n.15. 
 120. Hearing on S. 52, supra note 21, at 5 (“[S]hall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen 
years . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 3 (1982) (“[S]hall . . . be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than fifteen (15) years nor more than life. . . .”). 
 121. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987). 
 122. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 92 (2001). 
 123. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974). 
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Congress said the goal of the ACCA was to provide a new federal offense to 
improve public safety by “incapacitat[ing] the armed career criminal for the 
rest of the normal time span of his career which usually starts at about age 15 
and continues to about age 30.”124 Congress expressed concern with judiciaries 
imposing ultra-lenient prison sentences on repeat offenders and parole boards 
releasing inmates well before the end of their sentence.125 By failing to 
adequately confine these offenders, courts and parole boards endangered their 
communities because they allowed these repeat felons to continue their careers 
as criminals.126 In order to protect these communities, Congress continually 
emphasized that the ACCA must prescribe a certain and substantial 
punishment—meaning no probation, suspended sentence, sentence less than 
fifteen years, or parole.127 
In light of this purpose, it is particularly telling that Congress inserted the 
word “imprisoned” in place of “sentenced to a term of imprisonment” in the 
ACCA. Pursuant to the initial language, “shall be . . . sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment not less than fifteen years nor more than life,” indicates the court 
must order a punishment between fifteen years and life imprisonment.128 
However, this provision does not contemplate a suspended sentence or parole 
because the verb “sentenced” only concerns the pronouncement of the sentence 
by the court.129 Consequently, this language enabled judges to evade the 
ACCA’s required sentence by issuing a sentence for fifteen years, but then 
suspending the execution of that sentence (i.e. giving probation). Furthermore, 
unless expressly stated otherwise in the act, a criminal sentenced under the 
1982 bill’s language could be released on parole well before serving the entire 
fifteen years. This difference is significant because Congress discussed during 
Senate and House hearings that many prisoners’ actual physical time spent in 
prisons was much less than the sentences given by courts prior to the ACCA’s 
enactment.130 
Congress manifested its effort to ensure a certain punishment of fifteen 
years actually served in prison with its word choice in the 1983 bill.131 Unlike 
the term “sentenced” in the 1982 bill, the verb “imprisoned” necessarily 
requires that both of the following cannot be less than fifteen years: the 
sentence issued by the court and the criminal’s physical presence in prison. In 
this context, “imprisoned” signals to courts and parole boards that no 
 
 124. S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 7. 
 125. Id. at 34. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 20–22. 
 127. Hearing on S. 52, supra note 21, at 8. 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 113–16. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 125–31. 
 131. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
606 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:591 
probation, suspension of sentence, sentence less than fifteen years (whether the 
defendant pleads guilty or is convicted following a trial), or parole shall be 
imposed upon an individual punished under the ACCA. Since Congress 
incorporated the word “imprisoned” at the same time it eliminated the “nor 
more than life” upper bound, it follows that Congress was creating a certain 
punishment, or “new maximums,” in accordance with the abovementioned 
three Supreme Court Justices’ opinions in the O’Brien oral argument.132 
This interpretation advances the congressional objective to incapacitate 
armed career criminals for the rest of their careers, which usually starts “at 
about age 15 and continues to about age 30.”133 Given that the average prison 
sentence for armed career criminals at this time was less than four years, an 
enhanced fixed-term of fifteen years imprisonment comports with Congress’s 
statutory language modifications, establishes a certain and substantial 
punishment, and prudently anticipates the potential for prisons 
overcrowding.134 Accordingly, the “shall be . . . imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years” language does not permit a sentence longer than fifteen years; 
rather it establishes a fixed term and at the same time prohibits courts and 
parole boards from relieving an ACCA offender of the required fifteen-year 
confinement.135 
D. Structure And Text 
The ACCA’s neighboring subsections within Section 924 reveal that 
Congress did not intend the ACCA’s imprisonment provision to establish a 
range up to life. Under Subsections 924(c), 924(j), and 924(o), Congress 
expressly provided that certain acts are punishable by “any term of years or for 
life.”136 The Supreme Court has reiterated, “[w]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate . . . exclusion” and it should not be implied in the section where it is 
excluded.137 Since Congress expressed a life maximum in three neighboring 
subsections, the absence of any language in the ACCA (924(e)) specifying a 
life maximum demonstrates Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate exclusion. To be sure, Congress omitted the “nor more than life” 
 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 83–90. 
 133. See supra note 124, at 7. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20. 
 135. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. § 924(c)(5)(B)(i) (emphasis added); Id. § 924(j)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). See also 
id. § 924(o). Also, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii) has the following imprisonment provision: “[B]e 
sentenced to imprisonment for life.” Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii). 
 137. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
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upper boundary from the ACCA’s text prior to its enactment. Therefore, 
imposing a life maximum into the ACCA contravenes the duty of courts to 
refrain from reading a particular phrase into a statute when Congress has left it 
out.138 
Furthermore, the public law illustrates that Congress routinely specified a 
life maximum when it wished to define such an upper boundary in statutory 
sentencing ranges during the time the ACCA was enacted. Several acts 
codified alongside the ACCA in P.L. 98-473 expressly define penalties with 
maximums of life imprisonment: Section 503(a) provides “not less than three 
years and not more than life imprisonment”; Sections 1002(a) and 2002(a) 
provide imprisonment for “any term of years or for life.”139 Congress codified 
the ACCA along with Sections 503(a), 1002(a), and 2002(a) in P.L. 98-473 on 
October 12, 1984, one year after deleting the ACCA’s life maximum 
provision.140 It is implausible that Congress intended this life maximum it 
deleted to be implied in the “not less than fifteen years” language when 
Congress expressly established a life maximum in several other acts codified in 
the same public law.141 
Courts that erroneously impose a maximum penalty of life imprisonment 
onto the ACCA render § 924, P.L. 98-473, and numerous other federal 
criminal statutes superfluous. As previously discussed, several of the ACCA’s 
neighboring provisions in § 924 and P.L. 98-473 explicitly define a maximum 
penalty of life. Similarly, outside of § 924, Congress has enacted dozens of 
statutory sentencing ranges of “not less than” a specified term of years or “for 
life.”142 For example, the sentencing range for sex trafficking of children by 
 
 138. Id. at 208. 
 139. Joint Resolution Making Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985, and for Other 
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2069, 2137, 2186 (1984). 
 140. Id.; see, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (“The more apparently deliberate the 
contrast, the stronger the inference, as applied, for example, to contrasting statutory sections 
originally enacted simultaneously in relevant respects[.]”). 
 141. See Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do 
not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it 
nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown 
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.”). 
 142. See 18 U.S.C. § 33(b) (2012) (sentencing range for damaging a motor vehicle carrying 
radioactive waste with intent to endanger safety is “imprison[ment] for any term of years not less 
than 30, or for life”); id. § 175c(c)(1) (sentencing range for possessing or transferring variola 
virus is “a term of imprisonment not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life”); id. § 
175c(c)(2) (sentencing range for using variola virus is “imprison[ment] for not less than 30 years 
or imprison[ment] for life”); id. § 225 (sentencing range for organizing a financial crime 
enterprise is “imprison[ment] for a term of not less than 10 years and which may be life”); id. § 
1121(b)(1) (sentencing range for killing a correctional officer by an inmate is “a term of 
imprisonment which shall not be less than 20 years, and [defendant] may be sentenced to life 
imprisonment or death”); id. § 1591(b)(1) (sentencing range for sex trafficking of children by 
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force or of a child under fourteen years of age is “imprisonment for any term of 
years not less than 15 or for life.”143 Accordingly, implying an unstated life 
 
force or of a child under 14 is “imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 or for life”); 
id. § 1591(b)(2) (sentencing range for sex trafficking of children between 14 and 18 is 
“imprisonment for not less than 10 years or for life”); id. § 1658(b) (sentencing range for 
extinguishing a light with intent to bring a ship into danger is “imprison [ment for] not less than 
ten years and [the defendant] may be imprisoned for life”); id. § 2241(c) (sentencing range for 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child is “imprison[ment] for not less than 30 years or for life”); id. § 
2251(e) (sentencing range for a second conviction of sexually exploiting a child is 
“imprison[ment] not less than 35 years nor more than life” and for sexually exploiting a child 
where death results is “punish[ment] by death or imprison[ment] for not less than 30 years or for 
life”); id. § 2251A(a) (sentencing range for selling or buying a child related to sexual conduct is 
“imprisonment for not less than 30 years or for life”); id. § 2252A(g) (sentencing range for 
engaging in child exploitation enterprise is “imprison[ment] for any term of years not less than 20 
or for life”); id. § 2332g(c)(1) (sentencing range for transferring or possessing missile systems 
designed to destroy aircraft is “imprisonment not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life”); 
id. § 2332g(c)(2) (sentencing range for using missile systems designed to destroy aircraft is 
“imprison [ment] for not less than 30 years or imprison[ment] for life”); id. § 2332h(c)(1) 
(sentencing range for transferring or possessing radiological dispersal devices is “imprisonment 
not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life”); id. § 2332h(c)(2) (sentencing range for using 
radiological dispersal devices is “imprison[ment] for not less than 30 years or imprison[ment] for 
life”); id. § 2423(a) (sentencing range for transporting minors to engage in criminal sexual 
activity is “imprison[ment] not less than 10 years or for life”); id. § 3559(f)(1) (sentencing range 
for murdering a child less than 18 is “ imprison[ment] for life or for any term of years not less 
than 30”); id. § 3559(f)(2) (sentencing range for kidnapping or maiming a child less than 18 is 
“imprison[ment] for life or for any term of years not less than 25”); id. § 3559(f)(3) (sentencing 
range for committing a crime of violence causing serious bodily injury to a child less than 18 is 
“imprison[ment] for life or for any term of years not less than 10”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 
(2012) (sentencing range for manufacturing or distributing certain quantities of controlled 
substances is “not less than 10 years or more than life” or “not less than 20 years or more than 
life” if death or serious bodily harm results or if the violation was committed after a prior 
conviction for a felony drug offense); id. § 841(b)(1)(B) (sentencing range for manufacturing or 
distributing certain quantities of controlled substances, if death or serious bodily injury results, is 
“not less than 20 years or more than life” or “not less than 10 years or more than life” if the 
violation was committed after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense); id. § 841(b)(1)(C) 
(sentencing range for manufacturing or distributing certain quantities of controlled substances, if 
death or serious bodily injury results, is “not less than twenty years or more than life”); id. § 
848(a) (sentencing range for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise related to controlled 
substances is “not [] less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment” or, in the case 
of a second conviction, is “not [] less than 30 years and which may be up to life imprisonment”); 
id. § 960(b)(1) (sentencing range for importing or exporting a controlled substance is “not less 
than 10 years or more than life” or “not less than 20 years or more than life” if death or serious 
bodily harm results or if the violation was committed after a prior conviction for a felony drug 
offense); 42 U.S.C. § 2272(b) (2012) (sentencing range for possessing or transferring atomic 
weapons is “imprisonment not less than 25 years or to imprisonment for life” or, for using the 
weapons, “imprison[ment] for not less than 30 years or imprison[ment] for life”); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 16, Lucas v. United States, No. 11-1536 (7th Cir. June 25, 2012). 
 143. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). 
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maximum in the ACCA violates the canon that courts must “construe statutes, 
where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof.”144 
More specifically, if the phrase “not less than fifteen years” were sufficient, by 
itself, to create a sentencing range of fifteen years to life, it would render 
superfluous the explicit grant of authority for life imprisonment by dozens of 
federal sentencing statutes.145 
Then, the superfluous “or for life” clause in dozens of statutory sentencing 
ranges would offend “a cardinal principle of statutory construction that [courts] 
must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”146 
Congress did not intend to forgo an upper limit for sentences under the ACCA, 
thereby authorizing sentences of up to life imprisonment, because Congress 
explicitly authorized an upper boundary of life imprisonment for those 
offenses it thought warranted such a penalty.147 Implying a life maximum in 
the ACCA would disregard the words “or for life” that operate as an upper 
boundary in many criminal statutes, in favor of words wholly absent from the 
ACCA. For that reason, courts should refrain from reading an unstated 
maximum sentence of life into the ACCA.148 
In order to comply with these canons of construction, the imprisonment 
provision of the ACCA is best understood as authorizing a fixed term of fifteen 
years. Congress pointedly did not define a life maximum in the ACCA. In fact, 
Congress expunged a life maximum in the ACCA prior to its enactment. The 
Supreme Court does “not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its 
adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and [the 
Court’s] reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the 
same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.”149 
Congress’s regular use of the “or for life” clause—which defines the upper 
boundaries in several of the ACCA’s neighboring subsections of 924, P.L. 98-
473, and dozens of criminal statutory sentences—proves Congress clearly 
knows how to establish a sentencing range with a maximum of life 
imprisonment. Therefore, similar to Stimpson, an unstated life maximum is 
unwarranted in the ACCA because Congress would have expressly granted it 
as the upper boundary had it intended to do so. As Justice Sotomayor 
postulated in the O’Brien oral argument, the minimum should become the de 
facto maximum. 
 
 144. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991). 
 145. Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers and Nat’l Ass’n of Fed. Defenders as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) (No. 
11-9335) [hereinafter Brief Supporting Petitioner]. 
 146. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). 
 147. See Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 7. 
 148. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (noting it is the duty of 
courts to refrain from reading a particular phrase into a statute when Congress has left it out). 
 149. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005). 
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The countervailing surplusage argument—that a fixed-term interpretation 
would render the words “not less than” superfluous—overlooks the ACCA’s 
history and text. In 1983, Congress signaled a fixed sentence of fifteen years 
by simultaneously incorporating the language “shall be . . . imprisoned not less 
that fifteen years” and omitting the “nor more than life” upper bound.150 As 
discussed above, Congress aligned the term “imprisoned”151 with the words 
“not less than” to inform judges that their regular practices of departing 
downward from required sentences, imposing probation, and suspending 
sentences are impermissible under the ACCA. Additionally, the “imprisoned 
not less than” language serves as notice to parole boards to deny the release of 
any prisoner sentenced under the ACCA. If Congress meant to grant the 
availability of a sentence more than fifteen years, it would not have removed 
the “nor more than life” language when it integrated the word “imprisoned.” 
Therefore, the phrase “not less than” in the ACCA is correctly interpreted to 
make crystal clear that judges needed to break their habit of imposing 
punishments below statutory-required imprisonment terms and the prisoner 
may not be released on parole. 
This interpretation is not abstract. Courts very frequently imposed 
sentences below statutory-required terms prior to the ACCA’s enactment,152 
and still today, a number of sentencing courts attempt to elude statutory ranges. 
As previously discussed, one of the ACCA’s neighboring subsections—§ 
924(c)—authorizes a sentence “to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 
years.”153 But prior to its amendment in 1998, the phrase “not less than” was 
absent from the penalty provision of § 924(c): “sentenced to imprisonment for 
five years.”154 Despite the Supreme Court and all of the Circuits recognizing 
the language in § 924(c) to mandate a fixed sentence of five years,155 several 
 
 150. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 142, at 11–16. 
 151. Other subsections within 924 use the phrase “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not 
less than” (the same phrase Congress used in the ACCA until it changed it in 1983) as opposed to 
the word “imprisoned not less than” in the ACCA. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), (B)(i)–(ii), 
(C)(i) (2012). “Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits 
it in another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Keene Corp, 508 U.S. at 208. 
 152. See S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 7 (1983). 
 153. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The previously discussed part was 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), which 
prohibits brandishing a machine gun in relation to a crime of violence and authorizes a sentence 
of “not less than 30 years.” This provision, 921(c)(1)(A)(i), is merely possession of any firearm 
during a crime of violence. 
 154. Id. § 924 (1996), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2006) (containing the same statutory 
sentencing language for the basic offense of possessing a firearm in relation to a crime of 
violence). 
 155. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 227 (1993); United States v. Harlan, 130 F.3d 
1152, 1152 (5th Cir. 1997); Stanback v. United States, 113 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Goggins, 99 F.3d 116, 117 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Anderson, 59 F.3d 1323, 
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district courts imposed lower sentences.156 In United States v. Higgs, the 
district court imposed a sentence of three years under § 924(c).157 Although the 
court acknowledged that § 924(c) facially stood for a five-year fixed sentence, 
it speculated that Congress might not have “adequately . . . consider[ed] certain 
[mitigating] factors.”158 The language “sentenced to . . . five years,” by itself, 
does not affirmatively forbid an imposition of a sentence lower than five years. 
This reflected congressional uncertainty to the sentencing court in Higgs, so it 
departed downward from the fixed term of five years to impose a more fitting 
punishment of three years. 
The ACCA more effectively establishes a certain punishment because its 
“imprisoned not less than” language affirmatively forbids the imposition of a 
lower sentence. Since the sentencing judge cannot look at the underlying facts 
of the defendant’s requisite convictions, and because the instant offense is 
merely possession of a firearm, it follows that many ACCA cases would tempt 
judges to depart downward from fifteen years. But Congress incorporated the 
ACCA’s penalty provision to ensure a concrete punishment. Unlike the penalty 
provision the Higgs court departed downward from, the words “imprisoned not 
less than” reinforce the ACCA’s prohibition on sentences shorter than fifteen 
years imprisonment, rather than grant an unstated life maximum penalty. 
 
1328 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Campusano, 947 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Hatch, 925 F.2d 362, 363 (10th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 555 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brown, 
915 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilkins, 911 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984, 985 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goodface, 835 
F.2d 1233, 1236 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 156. See United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 795 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[t]he district 
court sentenced defendant to five years probation, notwithstanding the five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence required by his conviction . . . under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).”); United States v. 
Higgs, 927 F.2d 597, 597 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 157. Higgs, 927 F.2d at 597. 
 158. Id. The penalty provisions under § 924(c) were amended in 1998 to “sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment for not less than [x] years” and separated into three different escalating terms 
based on whether the defendant possessed (not less than 5 years), brandished (not less than 7 
years), or discharged (not less than 10 years) the firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012). 
One sponsor of the bill seemed to think that the fixed-terms would remain with the addition of the 
“not less than” language when it was amended in 1998, explaining it would “[p]rovide a seven 
year sentence for ‘brandishing’” and “[r]aise the penalty to ten years if the gun is discharged.” 
144 CONG. REC. S12,671 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1998) (statement of Sen. DeWine). The presidential 
signing statement also reflected this notion. See Remarks on Signing Legislation to Provide 
Educational Assistance to Families of Slain Officers and Strengthening Penalties for Criminal 
Using Guns, 34 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 2307, 2309 (Nov. 13, 1998) (“[T]he bill I sign today 
will add 5 years of hard time to sentences of criminals who even possess firearms when they 
commit drug-related or violent crimes. Brandishing the firearm will draw an extra 7 years; firing 
it, another 10.”). 
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Nevertheless, it would misconstrue the surplusage canon to conclude the 
fixed-term interpretation of the ACCA renders the words “not less than” 
superfluous. In order to adhere with the canon, the construction must actually 
avoid a surplusage problem to be valid; it does not dictate the construction of a 
statute if that construction would create another surplusage problem. Under the 
ACCA, to interpret the words “not less than” to imply a life sentence is 
permitted would render superfluous the express specification of life maximums 
in the twenty-six statutory sentencing ranges mentioned above.159 This 
interpretation would emasculate more statutory language than that to which it 
would assign meaning.160 Since “the canon against surplusage merely favors 
that interpretation which avoids surplusage,”161 “that comparison weighs in 
favor of the fixed-term interpretation.”162 
E. Fair Notice and Other Policy Concerns 
Due process requires that offenders of the ACCA not be required at peril of 
their liberty to speculate as to its meaning.163 In Stimpson, Justice Curtis 
rejected the notion of an implied maximum above the prescribed penalty: 
“mere implication can hardly ever be a safe ground on which to rest a penalty, 
and when penalties of unlimited magnitude are the subjects of the implication, 
the danger of making it, and the improbability of its correctness, are 
proportionately increased.”164 A life maximum in the ACCA poses an 
unconstitutional danger because it subjects its offenders to punishment that is 
not clearly prescribed.165 Justice Sotomayor alluded to this concern in the 
O’Brien oral argument, specifically that offenders would not know what they 
are exposed to.166 Vague sentencing provisions pose constitutional problems 
when they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating the 
criminal statute.167 
The rule of lenity, a vehicle courts use to apply fair notice principles, 
points to the fixed term-interpretation of the ACCA’s sentencing clause. The 
rule of lenity requires ambiguous laws to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendant subjected to them.168 It applies to the substantive scope of criminal 
statutes and extends to the severity of sentence169 because it is grounded in the 
 
 159. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 160. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 142, at 16. 
 161. Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012). 
 162. Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 15. 
 163. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
 164. Stimpton v. Pond, 23 F.Cas. 101, 102 (D. Mass. 1855). 
 165. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). 
 166. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 15. 
 167. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 
 168. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514. 
 169. United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305 (1992). 
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instinctive distaste against one languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has 
clearly said they should.170 When an offender examines the ACCA’s text, 
construction, and legislative history, a life maximum is not plainly visible. 
Rather, it would, at best, amount to a guess. Under the rule of lenity, when 
given two options, in order for a court to apply the harsher construction of the 
statute, its text must be plain and unmistakable.171 
Furthermore, the adjudicative mechanism of the ACCA supports the 
imprisonment provision to constitute a fixed term of fifteen years. Prior to the 
enacted ACCA, the earlier bills proscribed an individual with two prior 
convictions from carrying a firearm during the commission of a robbery or 
burglary.172 But after President Reagan vetoed the bill, the enacted ACCA 
outlawed a person with three previous convictions from mere possession of a 
firearm.173 
Under the prior bills, the triggering offense proved to a jury would have 
been the third violent felony committed with a firearm.174 For that reason, the 
sentencing judge would have been able to consider the defendant’s conduct 
underlying the third conviction. For example, this enables the sentencing judge 
to consider whether the defendant’s third conviction for armed robbery was 
committed with a starter gun or a machine gun;175 whether it was motivated by 
a desperate family financial situation or merely a desire for excitement; 
whether the robber meant to inflict a greater harm or simply intended to pull 
off the armed robbery; whether the robber wielded a firearm himself or simply 
drove the getaway car; whether the victim was a blind newsstand operator or a 
person against whom the robber had legitimate grievances; whether the robber 
stole a loaf of bread or one million dollars; and whether the robber walked 
voluntarily into a police station to confess or desperately resisted capture.176 
 
 170. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); see also R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 307–11 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing that rule of lenity applies to sentencing statutes); Brief 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 145, at 16. 
 171. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348. 
 172. Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52, supra note 115, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 173. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 8 (1984). 
 174. See S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20, 24 (1983). 
 175. The U.S. Code states: 
[A] [f]irearm means any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or 
may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; the frame or 
receiver of such weapon; or any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or any destructive 
device. Such term shall include any handgun, rifle, or shotgun. 
18 U.S.C. § 921(3) (2012). A starter gun is the gun used to signal the start of a track-and-field 
event. 
 176. See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of 
Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 556–57 
(1978). 
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Unlike the prior bills, reading a life maximum into the current ACCA 
threatens disproportional sentencing because the above-mentioned Supreme 
Court holdings constrain a sentencing judge to consider only the fact of the 
three prior convictions. The core crime proved to a jury under the enacted 
ACCA is merely possession of a firearm. Therefore, the judge may review the 
underlying facts of that offense to determine the sentence.177 But the Court in 
Taylor held that sentencing judges may “look only to the statutory definitions” 
of all three of the defendant’s prior offenses, not “to the particular facts 
underlying those convictions” disclosed by the record.178 The Descamps 
majority recognized that “extending judicial fact-finding beyond the 
recognition of a prior conviction” to “try to discern what a trial showed, or a 
plea proceeding revealed, about a defendant’s underlying conduct” produces a 
“constitutional rub,” because “[t]he Sixth Amendment contemplates that a 
jury—not a sentencing court—will find such facts, unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”179 In other words, the sentencing judge may only find the 
charges on which the defendant was convicted, rather than what the defendant 
actually did, to determine the sentence.180 
Since courts examine what the predicate convictions necessarily 
involved—not the facts underlying the cases—courts must presume the 
convictions “rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts” 
criminalized.181 As a result, a large available sentencing range from fifteen 
years to life is frequently unnecessary because courts are forbidden to increase 
a sentence based on most aggravating factors. 
Furthermore, although the defendants’ constitutional rights forbid it, 
judges are tempted to examine the defendants’ conduct in their requisite prior 
convictions to determine the most proportional punishment.182 The existence of 
a life maximum in the ACCA persuades judges to convert a limited and 
narrowly applied assessment of the fact of a prior conviction into a device to 
evaluate the facts that the jury found.183 But a fixed term of fifteen years would 
eliminate the broad discretion available to judges in the fifteen years to life 
range and necessarily remove this temptation. 
 
 177. Mere possession of firearm offenses typically do not create much disparity between 
sentences. If the defendant performs criminal conduct in connection with the firearm, a variety of 
other more exacting offenses are available to federal prosecutors to charge. 
 178. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 179. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288 (2013). 
 180. Id. at 2283. 
 181. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 137 (2010); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 
S. Ct. 1678, 1684–85 (2013). 
 182. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–15, Davis v. United States, No. 13-602 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 14, 2013). 
 183. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287. 
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In addition to affording better protection to defendants’ constitutional 
rights, a fifteen-year fixed term most effectively comports with the actual 
operation of the ACCA. The average sentence length in 2012 for criminals 
sentenced under the ACCA was fifteen years.184 Even though the majority of 
circuits hold the ACCA implies a life maximum, the average sentence remains 
at fifteen years because the “imprisoned not less than fifteen years” clause 
serves as an affirmative directive to sentencing judges that imposition of a 
lower sentence is prohibited;185 and because a higher sentence is typically 
unjustified as sentencing courts are precluded from examining the defendant’s 
conduct underlying the requisite convictions and therefore must presume the 
convictions rested upon the least of the acts criminalized. Although the judge 
may consider the defendant’s conduct underlying the instant offense, there is 
typically little disparity in possession of firearms cases because prosecutors 
charge more exacting firearm statutes if the firearm is brandished, discharged, 
or results in a death.186 
As a result, judges sentence ACCA offenders very consistently. But there 
are occasional deviations, and district court sentences within a statutory range 
are near impossible to overturn.187 In view of appellate courts’ reluctance to 
overturn within range sentences, an upper bound of life imprisonment based on 
mere implication is extremely dangerous. 
CONCLUSION 
No court has adequately explained why an absence of language giving the 
sentencing court discretion to sentence life imprisonment under the ACCA, 
nevertheless, means it may do so.188 Rather, courts have simply grounded this 
finding on precedent. 
However, these courts have not relied on all of the relevant precedent. The 
Stimpson and Lin courts thoroughly explained why the “not less than” 
language, without an expressed maximum, authorizes a fixed term penalty, and 
nothing higher. Three Supreme Court Justices reinforced this idea almost a 
century after Lin during the O’Brien oral argument. Without disagreement 
from anyone else on the bench, Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Sotomayor 
expressed their distrust when the Government suggested the “not less than” 
language implied a life maximum. 
 
 184. Quick Facts, supra note 12. 
 185. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 142, at 16. See also supra notes 148–54 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). 
 187. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 370 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that a 
district court’s within range sentence is absolute and unreviewable). 
 188. United States v. Walker, 720 F.3d 705, 709 (8th Cir. 2013) (Bright, J., concurring). 
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The legislature’s actions when crafting the ACCA are also revealing. Prior 
to enacting the ACCA into law, Congress deleted the words “nor more than 
life” and inserted the word “imprisoned” in place of “sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment.” In its current form, the “shall be . . . imprisoned not less than 
fifteen years” provision emphasizes Congress’s aspiration that ACCA 
offenders actually serve an entire fifteen-year prison sentence. The verb 
“imprisoned” signals to courts and parole boards that no probation, suspension 
of sentence, sentence less than fifteen years, or parole shall be imposed upon 
an individual sentenced under the ACCA. 
Since Congress expressed a life maximum in three neighboring subsections 
under § 924, the absence of any language in the ACCA specifying a life 
maximum shows that Congress acted purposely in the disparate exclusion. In 
addition, it is doubtful that Congress intended the life maximum it deleted to 
be implied in the “not less than fifteen years” language when Congress 
expressly established a life maximum in several other acts codified in the same 
public law. If the phrase “not less than fifteen years” were sufficient, by itself, 
to create a sentencing range of fifteen years to life, it would render superfluous 
the explicit grant of authority for life imprisonment by dozens of federal 
sentencing statutes. Therefore, an unstated life maximum is unwarranted in the 
ACCA because Congress would have expressly granted it as the upper 
boundary had it intended to do so. In the future, hopefully courts will fully 
recognize the ACCA’s text, legislative history, and current adjudicative 
mechanism, along with past and current Supreme Court Justices’ viewpoints 
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